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Abstract 
Purpose – Celebrex became the first of a new class of drugs known as COX-2 selective non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs. It improves treatment for arthritis sufferers without 
compromising the protective lining of the stomach. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate 
how direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of prescription medicines can be used to rebuild 
faith in the cyclooxygenase-2 (COX-2) product category. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The case is developed using published sources and no 
input is required from company representatives. The presentation style follows the classic 
comprehensive case format used in postgraduate teaching programmes. 
 
Findings – Business executives and strategic marketing students would benefit from a 
discussion on how external environmental factors can suddenly impose a review of marketing 
strategy. The reader learns how management addresses the business dilemma using DTCA. 
 
Research limitations/implications – A blockbuster rival drug Vioxx is withdrawn due to 
cardiovascular (CV) health safety concerns. A resulting dominant market situation soon 
becomes a business dilemma. The Federal Drug Administration calls for a “black box” 
warning label on Celebrex, the most serious type of warning. 
 
Practical implications – The implications are that having a product in a class of its own is 
not enough. It highlights the need to communicate to different audiences, to both the medical 
profession and the end-user. Getting doctors to recommend the medicine and pulling the 
product through the channel by stimulating patient demand after a health scare are 
paramount. 
 
Originality/value – This is the first pharmaceutical business case where the withdrawal of a 
rival product leaves the dominant competitor in a monopoly situation. Contrary to 
expectation, market share plummets despite the absence of competition. 
Keyword(s): 
Marketing communications; Marketing strategy; Pharmaceuticals industry; Drugs; Medical 
prescriptions. 
His local pharmacy has become an important part of Jim's life in his later years. The 67 year 
old knows the routine all too well as he hands in his repeat prescription at the counter. The 
friendly pharmacy assistants greet him by his name; they have come to know Jim well, he 
smiles at them and nod, “Another box of my usual, thanks”. Jim waits patiently for his 
pharmacist to fill his script, he rubs his protruding knuckles to try and ease the ever present 
pain. He no longer recognises his once strong hands; they have since been crippled and 
deformed by the relentless grip of his arthritis. The pharmacist knows of Jim's disabling 
condition and no longer asks him to sign for his prescription, but rather sign on his behalf to 
spare him his pride. Once his prescription is ready, Jim collects his medicine and exclaims, 
“Whatever did they do before Celebrex! I'll be back in a month to collect my next box; I can't 
go a day without them.” 
Arthritis 
Jim is not alone. Arthritis is a musculoskeletal disorder that is one of the most common 
causes of disability in the USA (Lawrence et al., 1998). It is generally accepted that the 
occurrence of arthritis does not vary amongst people living in Europe or North America 
(Symmons et al., 2002). Arthritis is often referred to as a single disease. It is a broad term for 
more than 100 medical conditions that affect the musculoskeletal system, more specifically 
joints (Yelin et al., 2007). Arthritis is characterised by pain, stiffness, inflammation and 
damage to joints and can result in joint weakness, instability, deformities and bone fracture. 
The scope of the effects can range from chronic pain to disability that can interfere with even 
basic daily tasks, such as walking, writing and meal preparation (Yelin et al., 2007). Of the 
100 forms of arthritis, the most common type is osteoarthritis; with prevalence in the hands, 
knee and hip joints occurring frequently in European populations over the age of 50 years 
(Peterson, 1996). Some recent statistics have been released in a national costs study relating 
to arthritis and rheumatic conditions in the USA (Yelin et al., 2007). Arthritis affects more 
than 46 million American adults (about one in five), osteoarthritis accounts for about 50 per 
cent of cases. As the population ages, the number of people with arthritis is expected to 
increase significantly. Current trends suggest that by 2030, 67 million US adults will suffer 
from some form of arthritis. Arthritis is not limited to the elderly; nearly two-thirds of 
arthritis sufferers are under the age of 65. Peterson (1996) report occurrence of the disease 
among a range of age brackets starting from as young as 25 years of age; the 45-54 and 55-64 
categories in European populations. Among adults of working age (18-64 years) work 
limitations attributable to arthritis affect about one-third of those with arthritis. Overall, 19 
million adults reported activity limitations due to arthritis. In 2003, the total cost of arthritis 
in the USA was $128 billion made up of both medical expenses and indirect costs, such as 
lost income (Yelin et al., 2007). The burden of arthritis is not to be understated and involves 
both the economic costs as well as the impact on the individual's quality of life (Peterson, 
1996). 
The pharmaceutical industry 
Medicines play a vital role in the treatment of arthritis. The pharmaceutical industry 
undertakes the development, production and supply of pharmaceutical products. The industry 
is under constant pressure to develop new, improved medicines that achieve superior health 
care. Not surprisingly, substantial Research and Development budgets are a distinguishing 
feature of the pharmaceutical industry. In the USA, pharmaceutical companies invested a 
combined $55.2 billion in Research and Development in 2006. The average cost of 
discovering and developing a new medicine is more than $1 billion, with development time 
spanning up to 15 years. Of the compounds discovered, only five of every 10,000 
investigated reach the clinical trial stage of development. Of those five, only one is ever 
approved for patient use. Once a pharmaceutical company has managed to get a new 
medicine to market, it still faces the challenge of recouping the cost of its development. On 
average only three out of ten medicines will recoup the cost of their development, clinical 
trials, registration and marketing. During the 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry witnessed 
the emergence of several blockbuster drugs each generating $1 billion in sales annually. The 
search for blockbuster discoveries was the strategy adopted by many of the big 
pharmaceutical companies as they recognised they could achieve shorter payback times. 
Other defining features of the pharmaceutical industry are the strict regulations governing the 
approval of new medicines and the tough controls over the promotion of pharmaceutical 
products. Despite such regulations, the pharmaceutical industry remains as one of the most 
successful and influential. Two key players in the global pharmaceutical industry include US-
based companies, Pfizer Limited and Merck & Company. 
Direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription drugs 
Direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of prescription drugs is strictly regulated in both the 
USA and in New Zealand, but the practice of using classic marketing communications tools 
is legal (Hoek and Gendal, 2004). The advertising of prescription drugs targeted directly to 
the public is a prohibited practice in most countries of the world, including Canada (Gardner 
et al., 2003). With healthcare mainly funded privately by consumers in the USA, consumers 
tend to argue that learning about new drugs on the market should not be the exclusive domain 
of doctor to patient communications (Morris and Griffen, 1992). In the past, medical 
advertising was confined to scholarly medical journals read by doctors (Smith, 2006). This 
time lag between approval of a new drug and the doctor's knowledge was seen as inefficient, 
a process that could be improved upon by using DTCA. DTCA of prescription drugs in the 
USA mainly consists of promotional print materials in mass media (Barrett, 1998). The 
purpose of DTCA is to influence consumers to request prescriptions from their doctors 
(Hollon, 1999). Gardner (2003) lists three types of DTCA aimed at the general public: 
1. product claim advertisements that promote the product name and therapeutic 
characteristics; 
2. reminder type advertisements that keep the brand name current with consumers; and 
3. help-seeking advertisements that inform customers about new treatments for diseases. 
The net benefit to the pharmaceutical industry in the USA and New Zealand has been to 
increase demand for many of its products, with little impact on patient-doctor 
communications (Hoek and Gendall, 2004). 
The purpose of this case study is to demonstrate how DTCA of prescription medicines can 
restore faith in the cyclooxygenase-2 (COX-2) (inflammation treatment) product category. 
Celebrex became the first of a new class of drugs known as selective non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs (NSAID's) for the treatment of arthritis. After the Federal Drug 
Administration required a “black box” warning due to CV health safety concerns, it became a 
strategic marketing exercise to communicate the benefits of this new drug to the mass 
consumer market, despite health safety concerns. This case study communicates the 
importance of exposing consumers experiencing daily pain to consider the facts using 
information in addition to the traditional doctor-patient consultation. It has implications for 
European countries and others such as Canada facing increasing pressure to consider DTCA 
legislation. 
Pfizer Limited 
Pfizer Limited is the world's largest pharmaceutical company. Founded in 1849, Pfizer has its 
corporate headquarters in New York and its operations extend over 150 countries. Pfizer the 
research-based biomedical and pharmaceutical company works “to discover, develop, 
manufacture and deliver quality, safe and effective prescription medicines” 
(www.pfizer.com). Although Pfizer's (2008) pharmaceutical business accounts for the 
majority of its revenues, the company is also a successful competitor in the consumer health 
and animal health sectors. The 1990s was a period of significant growth and advancement for 
Pfizer pharmaceuticals and among its many success stories were a series of blockbuster 
drugs. Of particular fame are Lipitor (a cholesterol lowering drug), Zoloft (an antidepressant) 
and Viagra (used to treat impotence). Pfizer develops and distributes medicines to treat a 
broad range of medical conditions spanning the entire body. 
Merck & Company 
Merck & Company is among the top seven largest pharmaceutical companies worldwide. 
Merck was first established in New York in 1891 and today has its headquarters in 
Whitehouse Station, New Jersey. The global research-driven pharmaceutical company 
operates in many countries under the name Merck Sharp & Dohme (2008). Merck discovers, 
develops, manufactures and markets vaccines and medicines that meet a diverse range of 
medical needs. Merck has experienced its own blockbuster success with a number of its 
prescription medications, including Zocor (a cholesterol lowering drug), Fosamax (an 
osteoporosis treatment) and Singulair (an asthma medicine), (www.msd.com). 
Traditional arthritis treatment 
To date, there is no cure for arthritis and treatment consists of symptom management 
particularly pain relief. Most arthritis sufferers take pain medication daily to control their 
symptoms, improve function and ultimately increase their quality of life. Inflammation is the 
defining feature of arthritis and effective pain relief involves treating this inflammation. Anti-
inflammatory drugs target the inflammation processes involved in arthritis. Until 1999, 
traditional NSAIDs were the treatment option of choice for arthritic patients. NSAIDs work 
by inhibiting the enzyme COX which produces prostaglandins within the body's cells. 
Prostaglandins promote inflammation and pain, they also protect the lining of the stomach. 
Within the body there are two forms of COX; COX-1 (produces prostaglandins that protect 
the stomach) and COX-2 (produces prostaglandins involved in inflammation). Traditional 
NSAIDs are non-selective, that is they act by blocking both COX-1 and COX-2 production. 
As a result they effectively treat inflammation, but can cause the unwanted side effects of 
stomach upset and ulcers. The gastric side effects are a cause for great concern given that 
they account for 20 per cent of all reported adverse drug events in the USA. Up to 40 per cent 
of NSAID users report gastric symptoms and about one in three long-term NSAID users will 
develop a stomach ulcer (Hassan-Alin et al., 2005). These can result in serious consequences 
including hospitalisation and even death. In the USA, it has been estimated that there are over 
100,000 hospital admissions per year and 16,500 deaths per year due to NSAID-induced 
gastric complications (Hassan-Alin et al., 2005). There are many different traditional or non-
selective NSAIDs available on the US market, both over-the-counter (OTC) and prescription 
only, including Ibuprofen (Advil®), Diclofenac (Voltaren®), Naproxen (Naprosyn®), 
Indomethacin (Indocin®), Ketoprofen (Orudis®) and Piroxicam (Feldene®). Refer to Table I 
for retail prices. 
COX-2 selective NSAID's 
In the late 1990s, a drug entered the market that revolutionised the treatment of inflammation. 
Celebrex® became the first of a new class of drugs known as COX-2 selective NSAIDs. 
Celebrex offered a huge advantage over traditional NSAIDs by way of effectively treating 
inflammation, without compromising the protective lining of the stomach. It was the answer 
that the medical profession and patients had been waiting for, a drug that tipped the 
benefit/risk scales in the favour of the patient and would successfully achieve improved 
treatment for arthritis sufferers. Like most drug launches, Celebrex's entry to the market was 
a long time in the making. At the heart of its discovery was Philip Needleman, the scientist 
that first hypothesised that there were two kinds of COX enzyme. Dr Needleman shepherded 
celecoxib (the active ingredient in Celebrex) through the drug development pipeline. From 
1989 Dr Needleman was the senior vice president and chief scientist of Monsanto Company 
and in 1993 he became president of Searle1Research and Development. He headed the team 
of medicinal chemists that researched and discovered the compound celecoxib which blocked 
COX-2, but spared COX-1. On 31 December 1998 the US Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) approved Celebrex, the first selective COX-2 to gain approval. 
The Celebrex Launch 
By early 1999, Celebrex was market ready and Searle established a USA co-promotional 
agreement with Pfizer, the world's largest pharmaceutical company. Searle had much to gain 
from joining forces with this pharmaceutical giant. Pfizer/Searle knew the superiority of their 
new, improved NSAID and the added value was captured in its price. Following extensive 
research of consumers, physicians, managed care organisations and computer modelling of 
competitors, the average wholesale price was set at $2.42 a capsule, ten to 20 times that of 
traditional NSAIDs (Spiegel and Gralnek, 2004). The Pfizer/Searle campaign targeted 
medical practitioners through a sales team of over 4,000 representatives involved in raising 
awareness among the medical profession and detailing doctors of the benefits of Celebrex. 
Accompanying the information was an abundant supply of Celebrex sample packs for doctors 
to use at their discretion. Study results and advertisements for Celebrex were placed in 
numerous medical publications to further capture the attention of doctors. To raise consumer 
awareness, Pfizer/Searle enlisted members of the American Gastroenterologist Association 
and sponsored a campaign that encouraged people with arthritis to take a quiz to establish if 
they were at risk of developing stomach ulcers, those found to be at risk were urged to talk to 
their doctor. After much anticipation Celebrex became widely available in February 1999 and 
the launch was the most successful in industry history. In its first year on the market, 
Celebrex sales exceeded $1.5 billion globally (Monsanto Annual Report, 1999). In 1999, 
there were 16.6 million total prescriptions filled for Celebrex, including 9.7 million new 
prescriptions written and 6.9 million refills (Monsanto Annual Report, 1999). The sales of 
Celebrex was driven by a powerful promotional campaign that continued to target both 
doctors and consumers. 
Enter Vioxx 
Many pharmaceutical companies were aware of the new COX-2 selective class of drugs and 
were eager to enter this unique market. Merck & Company, another global research-driven 
pharmaceutical giant, had developed its own selective COX-2 inhibitor, rofecoxib, which 
they branded Vioxx®. Merck was working hard to propel Vioxx through the regulatory 
processes and gain FDA approval. This enabled Merck to launch Vioxx just months after 
Celebrex. In May 1999, Vioxx entered the market; Celebrex was no longer the only drug in 
its class. Within days of approval, Merck's sales representatives, including members of a 
specialty sales force, fanned out to educate doctors about Vioxx and provide them with 
samples. Vioxx was priced comparably with Celebrex, with a similar premium over the price 
of traditional NSAIDs. Therapeutically and economically, there was no significant difference 
between Vioxx and Celebrex. In an effort to gain a competitive advantage both products were 
backed by impressive advertising budgets. In 2000, Merck spent over $160 million on DTCA 
and almost $80 million was spent to promote Celebrex (Porter, 2002). These are impressive 
marketing communications expenditures when one consider that in the same year $125 
million was spent on Pepsi Cola, one of the most advertised soft drinks (Stanford University 
Medical Centre, 2005). The advertising campaigns paid off with Celebrex and Vioxx 
capturing one-third of the 111 million NSAID prescriptions for the year ending August 2000. 
Despite Merck's advertising expenditure on Vioxx being double that spent on Celebrex, 
Celebrex retained its position as COX-2 market leader. 
2000-2004 
Celebrex continued to narrowly outperform Vioxx. The advertising campaigns achieved 
widespread brand recognition and people with pain from causes other than arthritis began to 
ask their doctors about the “newer, better anti-inflammatories”. This in effect expanded the 
COX-2 market by eroding the traditional NSAID market and increasing the total demand for 
painkillers. In 2002, the makers of Celebrex released a second Cox-2 inhibitor, valdecoxib, 
under the brand name Bextra®. Once again Pfizer agreed to be a co-promotional partner. 
Through a series of acquisitions, Pfizer gained complete control of both Celebrex and Bextra 
in 2003. Over the subsequent years, Pfizer and Merck both enjoyed the benefits associated 
with the healthy growth of the COX-2 market. The companies continued to investigate other 
possible uses for their COX-2 inhibitors in an effort to gain FDA approval for additional 
indications. 
Vioxx withdrawal 
On 30 September 2004 Merck announced the voluntary, worldwide withdrawal of Vioxx 
(refer to Appendix 1). The landmark decision came following evidence that Vioxx increased 
the risk of serious CV events, including heart attacks and stroke. The findings were revealed 
in the Adenomatous Polyp Prevention on Vioxx (APPROVe) study, which was designed by 
Merck to broaden the medical conditions that Vioxx was indicated to treat. The APPROVe 
clinical trial was also designed to further assess the CV safety of Vioxx and refute ongoing 
criticism. As early as mid-2000, concerns had been raised over the effects of Vioxx on the 
heart. In June 2000, the FDA received results from Merck's Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes 
Research (VIGOR) study that found an increased risk of serious CV events in patients taking 
Vioxx compared to patients taking naproxen (a traditional NSAID) (FDA News, 2004). The 
FDA took considerable time deliberating over the VIGOR results along with other available 
data, consulting with its Arthritis Advisory Committee regarding the interpretation of the 
safety information. The FDA took until April 2002 to formulate its response to the VIGOR 
findings, which involved strict labelling requirements for Vioxx. The labelling changes 
included warnings about the increase in risk of CV events, including heart attack and stroke. 
Merck obeyed the new labelling conditions and continued to promote the effectiveness and 
safety of Vioxx. The warnings did not seem to have a significant impact on sales, with 2003 
Vioxx global sales totalling $2.5 billion. 
Evidence was mounting regarding Vioxx's CV safety and the APPROVe results could not be 
ignored. Of great concern was the number of people taking Vioxx. Since its launch in May 
1999 to August 2004 it was estimated that there were 105 million prescriptions written for 
Vioxx in the USA alone, representing approximately 20 million American patients 
(www.merck.com). The APPROVe results called for immediate action to be taken and Merck 
opted for a proactive strategy involving withdrawing Vioxx on its own terms as opposed to 
defending Vioxx against inevitable scrutiny and backlash. Raymond Gilmartin, chairman, 
president and chief executive officer of Merck commented on the decision: 
Although we believe it would have been possible to continue to market Vioxx with labelling 
that would incorporate these new data, given the availability of alternative therapies and the 
questions raised by the data, we concluded that a voluntary withdrawal is the responsible 
course to take (Barclay, 2004). 
There was no denying that Vioxx was a blockbuster drug for Merck and a vital contributor to 
the company's revenue. Merck knew that it would suffer greatly from the Vioxx withdrawal. 
However, Merck was very calculating in its decision and in weighing up the options 
concluded that withdrawal was most appropriate course of action. No doubt minimising the 
risk of medical liability was a key motive. The enormity of Merck's decision to remove 
Vioxx from the market was reflected in news of the withdrawal flooding the global media. 
Impact on Merck 
As anticipated the Vioxx withdrawal hit Merck hard. The financial burden associated with the 
2004 withdrawal had an immediate effect on Merck's results. In 2004, Merck observed an 
estimated $1.24 billion reduction in sales; consisting of $490 million due to customer returns 
of Vioxx and up to $750 million in forgone sales of Vioxx for the fourth quarter. Not only 
were sales down, but also expenses were up including $141.4 million of expenditure to 
undertake the withdrawal of Vioxx and $93.2 million related to write-offs of Vioxx stock 
held by Merck. Additionally, the company set aside a reserve of $675 million solely for its 
future legal defence costs related to Vioxx litigation, this did not allow for any potential 
liability as a consequence of such litigation. As of 31 January 2005 Merck had been served 
with approximately 850 lawsuits, which included over 2,400 plaintiff groups alleging 
personal injuries as a result of taking Vioxx. Further lawsuits had been filed against Merck by 
various shareholders of the company, accusing Merck of making false and misleading 
statements regarding Vioxx. The legal struggle was not contained to the USA with lawsuits 
also filed in Europe, Australia, Canada, Brazil and Israel. Merck's annual report, 2004 reflects 
on the unfavourable consequences of the Vioxx withdrawal (www.merck.com). 
A doubtful market 
Merck's exit from the COX-2 market in 2004 left Pfizer as the only remaining team with its 
two key players, Celebrex and Bextra. Under other circumstances this competitive free 
atmosphere would appear as the ideal market. However, the Vioxx withdrawal had left it a 
doubtful market for there was uncertainty as to whether or not the CV risks associated with 
Vioxx extended across the entire COX-2 class of drugs. The Vioxx controversy placed the 
spotlight on the COX-2 inhibitor class and both Celebrex and Bextra were subjected to 
immense scrutiny. The FDA was on alert and determined to avoid further embarrassment and 
criticism. The safety of Celebrex had been called into question as early as December 2004, 
just months after the withdrawal of Vioxx. The Adenoma Prevention with Celebrex study 
conducted by the National Cancer Institute findings revealed an increased risk of heart 
problems with patients taking Celebrex. On 17 December 2004 the FDA ordered Pfizer to 
suspend all DTCA of Celebrex while the agency evaluated the available information 
regarding the safety of Celebrex. During the period Pfizer was permitted to continue selling 
Celebrex. 
Implications for Pfizer 
The FDA undertook lengthy proceedings and thorough analysis of the available evidence for 
all NSAIDs. From 16 February 2005, a three-day, intensive meeting of the Drug Safety and 
Risk Management Advisory Committee and the Arthritis Advisory Committee was held to 
discuss the risks and benefits of the NSAID class of drugs. The main objective of the meeting 
was to decide on an appropriate course of action and make recommendations to the FDA. The 
committees struggled to reach agreement on the fate of individual drugs, recognising the need 
for further studies into the safety of NSAIDs. It took a further couple of months until the 
FDA announced its stance (refer to Appendix 2). In April 2005, the FDA called for the 
withdrawal of Bextra, after it concluded that the risks outweighed the benefits. Pfizer 
cooperated with the FDA and Bextra was removed from the market on 7 April 2005. 
Although Bextra was not as lucrative a product as Celebrex, it was still a strong seller and 
withdrawal was a blow to Pfizer wiping out $1.3 billion annual sales. At the same time, the 
FDA called for Pfizer to place a “black box”, the most serious type of warning, on the 
Celebrex label. The boxed warning was to highlight the potential for increased risk of heart 
attacks and stroke and stomach bleeding associated with Celebrex use. It would appear that 
Celebrex was not singled out, as manufactures of all prescription NSAIDs were required to 
revise their labelling to include the same boxed warning as Celebrex. Dr Joseph Feczko, 
Pfizer's chief medical officer commented on the new labelling requirements: 
We have worked closely with the FDA to ensure that Celebrex's label provides physicians 
and patients with the information they need to make the most appropriate and most informed 
treatment decisions (www.consumeraffairs.com). 
The “black box” warning was the FDA's last resort before issuing notification of recall. 
Celebrex had narrowly escaped having to be withdrawn, much to relief of Pfizer. In the eyes 
of Pfizer keeping Celebrex on the market was of upmost importance. Celebrex remained the 
only COX-2 inhibitor available to the millions of arthritis and pain sufferers. Celebrex now 
had a monopoly, but the COX-2 market was not the prospering multi-billion dollar market it 
once was. Doctors and patients viewed COX-2 inhibitors with great caution and prescription 
numbers plummeted. Certainly following the withdrawal of Vioxx in December 2004, Pfizer 
would have hoped to capture Vioxx's $2.5 billion share of the market in 2005. However, 
Pfizer's inability to capture the additional market share was reflected in the decline in 
Celebrex sales from 2004 to 2005 (Figure 1). Ongoing safety concerns of all COX-2 
inhibitors coupled with the lack of Celebrex advertising would have no doubt contributed to 
the dramatic reduction in Celebrex sales. Indeed, Celebrex had not emerged from the Vioxx 
scandal unscathed. 
Pharmaceutical promotion tools – restoring the faith 
Medical doctors have a special role in the consumer decision-making process of 
pharmaceutical products. In most countries of the world consumers have little influence or no 
choice of the drug or brand; the decision is made by the medical practitioner (Pitt and Nel, 
1988). Marketing of prescription drugs is to and through the medical profession (Smith, 
2006; Pitt and Nel, 1988). In a study measuring the relative influence of advertising to 
influence prescribing behaviour by doctors, Pitt and Nel (1988) found that personal 
experience with the product was the most influential factor. The implications are that Pfizer 
could use the influence of the doctor to restore the public's confidence in Celebrex. In the 
USA, they had an additional tool to broaden the reach of the advertising message. The USA 
and New Zealand markets allowed DTCA. The company decided to focus its efforts on 
addressing the concerns of both the medical profession and patients regarding the safety of 
Celebrex. In response to their concerns and questions, Pfizer communicated the risks and 
benefits of Celebrex. In October 2006, Pfizer commenced the prospective randomized 
evaluation of Celecoxib integrated safety versus ibuprofen or Naproxen study, to further 
understand the safety of Celebrex in comparison to traditional NSAIDs. In April 2006, Pfizer 
reintroduced Celebrex direct-to-customer advertising in the USA. The new advertisements 
were vastly different to those used in the past. Rather than merely emphasising the ability of 
Celebrex to effectively ease arthritis pain, the new campaign took care to directly talk about 
the side effects of Celebrex and stress that Celebrex still represented a good treatment option 
for some patients. The unconventional, two-and-a-half minute advertisement was used as an 
opportunity to educate patients about Celebrex. The animated television commercial was 
made up of only white lines on a blue background; on closer inspection of the lines it is 
revealed that they are the words from the package inserts of Celebrex and other drugs. These 
lines are used to create graphics of people running, dancing and cycling (refer to Figure 2). 
The advertisement does not shy away from the boxed warning pertaining to Celebrex, but 
rather emphasises that all NSAIDs are required to carry the same boxed warning. Also 
mentioned in the advertisement is the fact Celebrex has never been taken off the market and 
the importance of treatment options for patients. The promotion cleverly conveys the 
message and encourages patients to talk to their doctors about Celebrex. By September 2006, 
the number of new prescriptions for Celebrex had risen by 9 per cent. Doctors were once 
again recommending the medicine and there was renewed demand by patients wanting to 
take Celebrex to relieve their pain. 
Controlling pain versus healthy hearts 
Presently, Celebrex maintains its monopoly of the COX-2 inhibitor market. The damaged 
reputation of the COX-2 class has discouraged new entrants and has made the medical 
profession and patients cautious. Pharmaceutical companies realise that need to recover lost 
ground in the COX-2 market to return to former glory. In matters concerning public health, 
safety concerns resonate long after the product withdrawal from the market. The devastating 
blow was felt not only by Merck, but by all stakeholders including patients, the medical 
profession, the FDA, NSAID market and even Merck's rival Pfizer also. The Vioxx 
withdrawal impacted the entire NSAID market suggesting the CV risks were class effects and 
not isolated to Vioxx. The aftermath of the “Vioxx withdrawal” endures years after its 
occurrence; however, as they say “time heals all wounds”. And whilst it is too early to 
determine whether the COX-2 market will ever fully recover from Vioxx, one fact remains, 
patients still have a strong need for pain relief. 
There is one constant throughout all this and that is the patient. Over the past few years of 
drug withdrawals and labelling changes, patients have continued to seek treatment for their 
pain. There are many people in the same situation as Jim that dread to think how they would 
cope without Celebrex. Celebrex has been proven effective for millions of arthritis sufferers 
worldwide and has achieved relief for those who previously believed their pain was 
untreatable. Arthritis and other conditions involving pain are unlike many medical conditions 
where patients do not experience any symptoms. There are varying degrees of pain, but its 
presence is difficult to ignore. For medical conditions that have numerous signs and 
symptoms, it is often the symptom of pain that motivates the patient to seek help. New 
research goes even further suggesting that pain causes arthritis (Fiorentino et al., 2008). 
Many pain sufferers rely on pain relievers to get them out of bed of a morning and help them 
through their day. To deny patients of effective pain options is to rob them of their quality of 
life. With this in mind Pfizer stands behind Celebrex and is committed to ensuring its 
availability to patients, particularly those suffering from arthritis. 
Managerial implications for the Celebrex brand 
The Vioxx withdrawal had resulted in public health safety concerns for regulators, the 
medical profession and the public at large. It highlighted the risks of using a similar product 
such as Celebrex after the CV health warnings related to the COX-2 market. Management 
will need to make an assessment of how to approach future marketing campaigns for a 
product with a “black box” label as required by regulators. Celebrex is not unique in 
marketing risky pharmaceutical products; for example, a similar risky situation exists with 
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors antidepressants. 
The continued use of DTCA remains a persuasive tool to win back targeted consumers such 
as chronic pain sufferers. Different age categories and the different types of musculoskeletal 
diseases are good bases for developing market segmentation strategies. Each segment can be 
successfully targeted with DTCA. The challenge to management would be to define the 
segmentation variables that could assist the Celebrex brand to overcome a known public 
health safety scare. One variable for segmenting markets suitable for use of COX-2 products 
is an assessment of evidence of risk to CV disease (Wong et al., 2005). One of the 
recommendations of this study is to: 
[…] adapt from a strategy of “blockbuster overreach” to a more segmented market indication, 
perhaps coupled with the use of biomarkers to detect existing or emerging risk of drug related 
adverse effects (Wong et al., 2005). 
An opportunity exists for Celebrex management to combine the predictive ability of medical 
science research and existing marketing segmentation skills to benefit consumers less prone 
to CV disease. 
A second challenge for Celebrex management is the question how to build the brand in 
markets that prohibit the use of DTCA. Currently, this challenge applies to most countries in 
the world except the USA and New Zealand (Gardner et al., 2003). Innovative brand 
managers have been complying with the letter of the law by using “un-named product” print 
advertising targeting customers in Australia. An example is the Viagra “Welcome back 
Tiger” campaign directed at consumers without the product brand name (Hall and Jones, 
2006). The Viagra advertisement feature a mature male with a tiger head sitting next to a 
satisfied looking female. A specific example of brand building using “un-named product” 
advertisements was the Arthritis Foundation advertisement telling arthritis patients to ask 
their doctors about a new drug. The advertisement acknowledged a sizable cash donation by 
the manufacturers of Celebrex (Barry, 2000). Australia is regulated by similar regulation as 
found in European markets with few complaints targeting consumers using the un-named 
product advertising strategies (Hall and Jones, 2006). There is evidence to suggest that 
countries in the Northern hemisphere with sophisticated health care infrastructure will 
experience an increasing trend towards DTCA as health care marketing and branding is tested 
in mass media applications (Langreth and Herper, 2006). 
Finally, when the Celebrex patent expires, generic competitors will force management to 
compete with an equal drug that is substantially less expensive to the customer. Is there room 
for a re-evaluation of their pricing policy? Pfizer is enjoying sole supplier status after the 
withdrawal of Vioxx. A lower price presents an opportunity to grow the market while there is 
little or no competition. It might just be their best strategy going forward judging by the 
statements of a new President Obama who has indicated to fight big pharmaceuticals to lower 
drug costs. Some even argue that DTCA is facing increasing opposition, in an effort to make 
health care more affordable in the USA (Gregory, 2009). There is no doubt Pfizer has much 
to ponder and forward strategic marketing planning is paramount. 
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Appendix 1. Merck announces voluntary worldwide withdrawal of Vioxx® 
Fixed graphic 1 
Whitehouse Station, New Jersey, 30 September 2004 – Merck & Co., Inc. today announced a 
voluntary worldwide withdrawal of VIOXX® (rofecoxib), its arthritis and acute pain 
medication. The company's decision, which is effective immediately, is based on new, three-
year data from a prospective, randomized, placebo-controlled clinical trial, the APPROVe 
trial. 
The trial, which is being stopped, was designed to evaluate the efficacy of VIOXX 25Ԝmg in 
preventing recurrence of colorectal polyps in patients with a history of colorectal adenomas. 
In this study, there was an increased relative risk for confirmed CV events, such as heart 
attack and stroke, beginning after 18 months of treatment in the patients taking VIOXX 
compared to those taking placebo. The results for the first 18 months of the APPROVe study 
did not show any increased risk of confirmed cardiovascular events on VIOXX, and in this 
respect, are similar to the results of two placebo-controlled studies described in the current 
US labelling for VIOXX. 
“We are taking this action because we believe it best serves the interests of patients,” said 
Raymond V. Gilmartin, chairman, president and chief executive officer of Merck. “Although 
we believe it would have been possible to continue to market VIOXX with labelling that 
would incorporate these new data, given the availability of alternative therapies and the 
questions raised by the data, we concluded that a voluntary withdrawal is the responsible 
course to take.” 
APPROVe was a multi-center, randomized, placebo-controlled, double-blind study to 
determine the effect of 156 weeks (three years) of treatment with VIOXX on the recurrence 
of neoplastic polyps of the large bowel in patients with a history of colorectal adenoma. The 
trial enrolled 2,600 patients and compared VIOXX 25Ԝmg to placebo. The trial began 
enrollment in 2000. 
VIOXX® (rofecoxib) is a registered trademark of Merck & Co., Inc. 
VIOXX was launched in the USA in 1999 and has been marketed in more than 80 countries. 
In some countries, the product is marketed under the trademark CEOXX. Worldwide sales of 
VIOXX in 2003 were $2.5 billion. 
Results of the VIGOR study, released in March 2000, demonstrated that the risk of 
gastrointestinal (GI) toxicity with VIOXX was less than with naproxen, but indicated an 
increased risk of CV events versus naproxen. However, in other studies including Merck's 
Phase III studies that were the basis of regulatory approval of the product, there was not an 
increased risk of CV events with VIOXX compared with placebo or VIOXX compared with 
other non-naproxen NSAIDs. Merck began long-term randomized clinical trials to provide an 
even more comprehensive picture of the CV safety profile of VIOXX. 
“Merck has always believed that prospective, randomized, controlled clinical trials are the 
best way to evaluate the safety of medicines. APPROVe is precisely this type of study – and 
it has provided us with new data on the CV profile of VIOXX,” said Peter S. Kim, PhD, 
president of Merck Research Laboratories. “While the cause of these results is uncertain at 
this time, they suggest an increased risk of confirmed CV events beginning after 18 months 
of continuous therapy. While we recognize that VIOXX benefited many patients, we believe 
this action is appropriate.” 
Merck has informed the US FDA and regulatory authorities in other countries of its decision. 
The company also is in the process of notifying health care practitioners in the USA and other 
countries where VIOXX is marketed. Patients who are currently taking VIOXX should 
contact their health care providers to discuss discontinuing use of VIOXX and possible 
alternative treatments. In addition, patients and health care professionals may obtain 
information from www.merck.com and www.vioxx.com, or may call (888) 36-VIOXX (1-
888-368-4699). 
The results of clinical studies with one molecule in a given class are not necessarily 
applicable to others in the class. Therefore, the clinical significance of the APPROVe trial, if 
any, for the long-term use of other drugs in this class, consisting of COX-2 specific inhibitors 
and NSAIDs, is unknown. The company will work with regulatory authorities in the 47 
countries where ARCOXIA is approved to assess whether changes to the prescribing 
information for this class of drugs, including ARCOXIA, are warranted. Merck is continuing 
to seek approval for ARCOXIA in other countries, including the USA. 
Merck will continue its extensive clinical program to collect additional longer-term data for 
ARCOXIA, its medication for arthritis and acute pain. 
With regard to financial guidance, prior to today's announcement, Merck remained 
comfortable with its 2004 earnings per share guidance of $3.11-$3.17. The company 
currently expects earnings per share to be negatively affected by $0.50-$0.60 as a result of 
today's announcement. This estimate includes forgone sales, write-offs of inventory held by 
Merck, customer returns of product previously sold and costs to undertake the pullback of the 
product. Included in this cost estimate is the expectation of forgone fourth quarter sales of 
VIOXX of $700-$750 million. In addition, Merck expects that worldwide approximately one 
month of inventory is held by customers and will be returned. 
At this point, it is uncertain which of these costs will be recorded in the third quarter and 
which will be recorded in the fourth quarter. Therefore, at this point, Merck is retracting the 
third quarter guidance it had previously provided. 
Merck will report third-quarter earnings on October 21. At that point, the company will 
provide additional information regarding the costs for product withdrawal. 
About Merck 
Merck & Co., Inc. is a global research-driven pharmaceutical company. Merck discovers, 
develops, manufactures and markets a broad range of innovative products to improve human 
and animal health, directly and thorough its joint ventures. 
Forward looking statement 
This press release contains “forward-looking statements” as that term is defined in the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These statements involve risks and uncertainties, 
which may cause results to differ materially from those set forth in the statements. The 
forward-looking statements may include statements regarding product development, product 
potential or financial performance. No forward-looking statement can be guaranteed, and 
actual results may differ materially from those projected. Merck undertakes no obligation to 
publicly update any forward-looking statement, whether as a result of new information, future 
events, or otherwise. Forward-looking statements in this press release should be evaluated 
together with the many uncertainties that affect Merck's business, particularly those 
mentioned in the cautionary statements in item one of Merck's Form 10-K for the year ended 
31 December 2003 and in its periodic reports on Form 10-Q and Form 8-K (if any), which the 
company incorporates by reference. 
Appendix 2. FDA news 
For Immediate Release      Media Inquiries: Kathleen Quinn 
P05-16                Ԝ301-827-6242 
7 April 2005            Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA 
The FDA today announced a series of important changes pertaining to the marketing of the 
non-steroidal anti-inflammatory class of drugs, including COX-2 selective and prescription 
and non-prescription (OTC) non-selective NSAID medications. A list of these products is 
available on the internet at: www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/cox2/default.htm 
“Today's actions protect and advance the health of the millions of Americans who rely on 
these drugs everyday,” said Dr Steven K. Galson, Acting Director of FDA's Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research. “FDA is providing the public information based on the latest 
available scientific data to guide the careful and appropriate use of these drugs aimed at 
maximizing their potential benefits and minimizing their risks.” 
FDA has asked Pfizer, Inc. to withdraw Bextra (valdecoxib) from the market because the 
overall risk versus benefit profile for the drug is unfavorable. FDA has also asked Pfizer to 
include a boxed warning in the Celebrex (celecoxib) label. Pfizer has agreed to suspend sales 
and marketing of Bextra in the USA, pending further discussions with the agency. Pfizer has 
agreed to work with FDA on the boxed warning for Celebrex. FDA is asking manufacturers 
of all other prescription NSAIDs to revise their labels to include the same boxed warning 
highlighting the potential for increased risk of CV events and GI bleeding associated with 
their use. Manufacturers of Celebrex and all other prescription NSAIDs will be asked to 
revise their labelling to include a medication guide for patients to help make them aware of 
the potential for CV and GI adverse events associated with the use of this class of drugs. 
In addition, FDA is asking the manufacturers of all OTC NSAIDs to revise their labels to 
include more specific information about the potential CV and GI risks, and information to 
assist consumers in the safe use of the drugs. FDA is also asking manufacturers of OTC 
NSAIDs to include a warning about potential skin reactions. The labelling of the prescription 
NSAIDs already addresses potential skin reactions. 
This current reexamination of the CV risks of NSAIDs began after Merck conducted a 
voluntary worldwide withdrawal of its COX-2 selective NSAID, Vioxx (rofecoxib), in 
September 2004. FDA will carefully review any proposal from Merck for resumption of 
marketing of Vioxx. 
These actions are based on the available scientific data, including data accumulated since the 
drugs were approved. The FDA has carefully considered the presentations, discussions and 
recommendations from the joint meeting of the Agency's Arthritis and Drug Safety and Risk 
Management Advisory Committee held on 16-18 February 2005. 
To inform the public and healthcare community of its decisions, FDA today issued a public 
health advisory and updated patient and healthcare practitioner fact sheets. 
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